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Abstract 
Low-cost innovation is increasingly becoming the focus of attention of both firms and policy 
makers in Emerging and Transition Countries. Previous research has elaborated on the ‘market 
based’ view of low-cost innovations captured under various terminologies such as ‘Frugal’, 
‘Good-enough’, ‘Resource-constrained’ etc. This study however demonstrates that low-cost 
innovation capabilities are profoundly influenced by the structuring of institutions, particularly 
the public-science system. The analysis in this paper is structured around innovation in 
rechargeable batteries in China and point-of-use water purification in India, drawing upon 
strategies at the Chinese firm BYD and Indian firm Tata respectively. Both the cases illustrate 
that diffusion oriented policies and weak university-industry links played a critical role in firms 
low-cost ‘incremental’ innovations. However as regards ‘pre-competitive’ research conducted 
in the public-science system, with the potential for better performing ‘radical’ technologies at 
lower costs, the current structure of institutions and firms strategies does not encourage firms 
to appropriate value from them into innovative output. This has important implications for both 
firms and policy makers in scaling-up low-cost radical innovations.  
Keywords: Low-cost Innovation, Emerging markets, Innovation system, Innovation 
capabilities 
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Introduction 
Management researchers have devoted considerable attention to the drivers of new product 
innovation and its impact on firm performance (Chesbrough, 1999; Teece, 1986; Tylecote & 
Ramirez, 2006). However research on innovation capabilities and strategies is largely based on 
the institutional structures of the developed west. Considerably less attention has been devoted 
to the study of innovation in Emerging and Transition Countries (ETC’s) (Ayyagari, Demirguc-
Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2011; Crescenzi, Rodriguez-Pose, & Storper, 2012). This is despite the 
fact that competitiveness of firms and regions in a globalizing economy rests on their ability to 
continuously develop, accumulate and exploit transnational capabilities (Cooke & Morgan, 
1998; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988). 
The majority of Customers in ETC’s are very price sensitive and have very different 
requirements to developed countries in terms of product and service requirements. Developing 
low-cost and good-enough innovation requires different strategies to premium products for 
western markets.  Williamson (2010) introduced the idea of ‘Cost innovation’ as solutions 
that offer similar functionalities to Western products at lower cost. An example of cost 
innovation is rechargeable Lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) made by the Chinese firm BYD which 
reduced production costs by 70% using a semi-automated process (Quan & Sanderson, 2013). 
Another popular concept is ‘Frugal Innovation’ (Bound & Thornton, 2012; Radjou, Prabhu, & 
Ahuja, 2012), which is not a re-engineered solution like BYD’s semi-automated process, but a 
product or service that may be quite disruptive because firms offering them are not competing 
merely against a traditional rival but also against “non-consumption” since the potential 
customer might not have the financial means or access to the necessary infrastructure for using 
it. Indian firm Tata’s ‘Swach’ water purifier that can remove 99% of disease causing bacteria 
is often cited as an example of frugal innovation (Tiwari & Herstatt, 2012). It was offered at a 
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price point keeping in mind the affordability constraints of the ‘base-of-pyramid’ income 
group.  
Despite the increasing attention on low-cost innovation in ETC’s (Brown & Hegel, 2005; 
Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011; Prahalad, 2006; Prahalad & Mashelkar, 2010;  Radjou et 
al., 2012; Zeng & Williamson, 2007), the existing literature is weak on the institutional 
antecedents of low-cost innovation. Firstly, most studies focus on the demand side in relation 
to customer affordability and accessibility. I argue that such a market-led approach on low-cost 
innovation puts a strong emphasis upon the need for ‘quick’ adjustments in reaction to an 
uncertain environment, rather than improving the efficiency of institutions, especially public-
science, labour and finance.  
Secondly, existing research on low-cost innovation in ETC’s ignores the role of endogenous 
‘radical’ innovation opportunities in remote areas from public-science institutions and the 
extent to which they are available to firms. Most of the advanced scientific and technological 
knowledge still exists in the triad countries (United States, Western Europe and Japan) and 
technology development in ETC’s continues to rely on transfer of knowledge and expertise 
from the industrially advanced economies, moreover it is often inappropriate to the needs of 
low-income consumers (Kaplinsky et al., 2009).  Archibugi and Pietrobelli (2003) also argue 
that the transfer of foreign technology per se has a negligible impact on learning unless 
accompanied by local innovation policies to promote learning, skills and technological 
capabilities.  Therefore this study analyses the relevance of endogenous technology innovation, 
particularly ‘radical’ innovation, because industrial policies that are only aimed at catching up 
with the developed west are unlikely to meet the needs of most people in ETC’s or enhance the 
financial performance of firms. The two gaps in prior research therefore lead to two research 
questions: 
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a.) How does the structuring of institutions lead to low-cost innovation capabilities among 
firms in ETC’s? 
b.) Can the existing set-up of public-science policies and mechanisms in ETC’s ensure 
low-cost radical innovation? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section offers empirical and theoretical 
background of the study. Then I present the methodology. In the penultimate section, I provide 
a detailed analysis using two select cases. I finally conclude the paper with some key research 
observations and implications.   
Background 
The potential market size of ETC’s has attracted management scholars and thinkers to 
investigate and analyse their role in globalization of technology and innovation. Ever since 
Vernon (1966) first proposed the product life-cycle theory, industrially advanced countries 
have been the focus of innovation diffusion studies. According to this classic notion, new 
products and technologies are first developed and launched in developed countries, and only 
later introduced in less developed countries when they have become increasingly mature, out-
of-date, and obsolete in the developed market.  
The large market potential of ETC’s has led to an increasing competition among firms fighting 
for a share of the pie (Gadiesh, Leung, & Vestring, 2007; Iyer, LaPlaca, & Sharma, 2006). 
However, despite a growing middle class in ETC’s, especially in Asia, most consumers still 
cannot afford western consumption and are often constrained by other bottlenecks, such as poor 
public and private infrastructure or limited service availability. As a result, firms have started 
to develop market-specific local innovations that are characterized by high-value at low-cost, 
and potentially disruptive. The rising demand for low-cost products among the aspiring 
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consumers of the developing world will drive an enormous global market for low-cost, high-
quality products.  
In the last decade, low-cost innovations in ETC’s have been explored extensively from many 
different perspectives (Agarwal, Grottke, Mishra & Brem, 2017). Although the increase in both 
academic research and business interest in this field has established the importance of emerging 
markets (Zeschky, Widenmayer, & Gassmann, 2011; Zedtwitz, Corsi, Soberg, & Frega, 2015) 
and developmental issues (Leliveld & Knorringa, 2018), however it has also led to numerous 
and often confusing terminologies, for e.g. ‘Frugal’, ‘Good-enough’ and ‘Resource 
constrained’, without clearly defining their scope and boundary. Most studies are conceptual 
in nature and apply terminologies to various cases in a cursory manner (see Hossain, 2017), 
rather than deep qualitative insights.  
Zeschky, Winterhalter, and Gassmann (2014) attempt to clarify the boundaries of various 
terminologies. They conceptualise the structural differences between the various innovations 
based on two dimensions of technical and market novelty. Cost innovation is low in both 
dimensions, good-enough innovation is at the intersection of low and medium on both 
dimensions, whereas frugal innovation is high in market novelty and medium in technical 
novelty. This suggests that the different natures of cost, good-enough and frugal innovation 
will require a different set of capabilities with frugal being the most challenging. However, the 
boundaries are still a bit blurry since it may be hard to define when the technology or market 
novelty level is low, medium or high (Quan, Loon, & Sanderson, 2018).  
The literature however appears to be lacking in theoretical underpinnings, specifically they 
seem to evade the fact that particular forms of innovation may be a result of specific structuring 
of institutions and not just a result of firms overcoming resource constraints and institutional 
voids. In addition, the relevance of advanced scientific skills in achieving low-cost innovation 
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has only been dealt with superficially by illustrating in hindsight how advanced science and 
technology can lower costs (Rao, 2017), rather than offering a prognosis of what institutional 
mechanisms need to be in place to ensure development and commercialisation of low-cost 
innovations.  A more exhaustive review of the various terminologies and examples of low-cost 
innovations is not imperative because this has been sufficiently dealt with (see Agnihotri, 2015; 
Hossain, 2017), instead I focus on the role of institutions in developing low-cost innovation 
competencies and offer a critique of relevant ‘conceptual’ studies that support my justification 
for this study.  
The presence of Lead Markets 
The emergence of ETC’s as a hub for low-cost innovations suggests their role as “lead market” 
(Herstatt & Tiwari, 2017; Tiwari & Herstatt, 2012). A “lead market” is a country or region 
where an innovative design is first widely accepted and adopted.  Tiwari and Herstatt (2012) 
argue that despite the generally low customer sophistication in ETC’s, innovator sophistication 
enables designing cost-effective, “good enough” solutions that can meet the needs and 
aspirations of consumers in a highly competitive market.  Similarly, Petrick and Juntiwasarakij 
(2011) assert that the key to innovating in and for emerging markets is to understand the 
importance of scale, and to address local consumption patterns where utility is more valued 
than efficiency. They also stress that emerging countries are not just about the economics of 
low-cost labour arbitrage, but also possess a growing talent pool that is in tune with the realities 
of their locale. This implies that firms need access to a competent and sufficiently large 
technical base with in-depth knowledge of the targeted consumers. However, access to 
technical skills is fundamentally dependent on structuring of institutions. Furthermore 
developing low-cost solutions is not only dependent on consumer demand and competition for 
a share of the pie, it also requires firms to have an innovation model that supports them in 
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identifying specific solvable problems and proposing possible modes of participation within 
the current institutional set-up.  
The role of Institutions  
The idea of a National Innovation System (NIS) is often used to understand how national 
institutions contribute to generation and diffusion of new technologies, and how government 
and firms negotiate policies to influence the innovation process (Metcalfe, 1995). The key 
components of innovation systems include firms of different types, public and private research 
organisations, education and vocational training institutions, financial institutions, business 
associations, research consortia etc. (Whitley, 2002; Whitley, 2007, p. 75).  
Although technological ‘catch-up’ and economic development have always been central to the 
NIS concept (Lundwall, 2007), the idea was conceived on institutional characteristics in 
developed countries (e.g. Japan, USA, Germany, Sweden) with ETC’s largely absent from 
discussions in early literature. Gu (1999) suggests that technology catch-up with the west, 
based on industrial models of the west and capital from the west is the best way to augment the 
innovation system in ETC’s. Though “imitation” catch-up activities may be considered as 
innovations since their adoption involves adaptations to the local context (Dutz, 2016) and may 
also positively correlate with new-technology development (Zhang & Zhou, 2016), ultimately 
ETC’s must implement an Innovation policy that is most appropriate for their country’s unique 
socio-economic structure.  
While ‘best practices’ implemented in developed and recently industrialised countries such as 
Korea can offer useful guidance, a ‘one size fits all’ solution is unlikely to align with the local 
context (Crescenzi, Rodríguez-Pose, & Storper, 2012; Niosi, 2010).  However National 
innovation systems may be weakening as different countries and also different regions within 
the same country may have advantages in different sectors, thus requiring different logics. Also 
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key features and characteristics of institutional frameworks governing finance, labour and 
public-science systems encourage firms to develop innovative competencies in different ways, 
and so generate different types of technology innovation in different societies (Whitley, 2007, 
p. 191).  
Innovation in ETC’s - overcoming Institutional Voids or Institutions as enablers?   
Bhatti  and Ventresca (2013) argue that, in addition to resource constraints faced by ETC firms 
upstream of their value chain in order to innovate and affordability constraints downstream in 
meeting the needs of the base-of-pyramid, firms are challenged by complex institutional voids 
characterised by the lack of institutional facilities, norms, and regulations needed for a well-
functioning economy. This is because of constraints on the limited capacity of governments in 
ETC’s to pursue various issues at a time.  Ernst, Kahle, Dubiel, Prabhu, and Subramaniam 
(2015) claim to draw on institutional theory to explain three antecedents of affordable value 
innovation - bricolage (creative combination of scarce existing resources to develop new 
solutions), local-embeddedness of a firm and product standardization.  
Both the above studies seek to explain how firms overcome institutional constraints rather than 
understanding how key features and structure of institutions in itself may encourage firms to 
develop low-cost innovations by building distinctive ‘organisational’ capabilities in 
accumulating and deploying their resources. While institutional voids generally limit business 
activity by increasing transaction costs and therefore represent a hurdle for firms and 
entrepreneurs (Soni & Krishnan, 2014), they may encourage development of new innovative 
competencies. Institutions can indeed facilitate innovation if firms have an adaptive ability that 
allows them to react to and play a more active role in overcoming any institutional constraints 
by taking over certain functions of institutions (Greeven, 2013).  
Moreover the development of specific ways of innovating depends not only on the strength of 
10 
 
institutions, but also on the complementarity of key institutions. Complementarity entails that 
the comparative advantage of a region or country depends upon the extent to which institutions 
are compatible with one another (Bruno, 2000). For example, a robust venture capital (VC) 
market is dependent upon the existence of clear rules governing intellectual property rights 
(Fenn, Liang, & Prowse, 1995). Because of institutional complementarity, different kinds of 
learning, cooperation and competition take place under different institutional settings (Whitley, 
2007, p. 84). Therefore both the strength of institutions and extent of complementarity lead to 
certain firm strategies and organisational forms to become prevalent.  
 
Developing Capabilities for Low-Cost Radical Innovation 
Strategic cost-innovation in high-tech firms that is primarily a result of efficient management 
of low-cost labour may not be perceived as genuine technological innovation (Zheng & Wang, 
2012). Moreover any Innovation is likely to be process innovation, new techniques that lower 
production costs. Also innovation for the base-of-pyramid, though market disruptive, could be 
a result of incremental improvements to existing technology and not a result of radical 
technology development (Agnihotri, 2015). However radical technological innovation is an 
important driver of the growth, success, and wealth of firms and nations (Tellis, Prabhu, & 
Chandy, 2009). Further, radical innovation offers novel functionalities and distinct customer 
benefits, which are difficult to imitate, and provides distinctive competitive advantages for the 
longer term (Bao, Chen, & Zhou, 2012).   Li, Li, Wang, and Ma (2017) suggest that because 
high resource consumption and high uncertainty are two of the most critical challenges for 
radical technological breakthroughs, for firms in ETC’s that are characterized by significant 
resource deficiency and high contextual uncertainty, it becomes necessary that they adopt 
resource acquisition and resource accumulation for effectively managing their resource 
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portfolios, and also embrace  resource flexibility and coordination flexibility for effectively 
managing their contextual uncertainties.  
A useful way of dealing with ‘adaptive’ and ‘flexible’ organisational capabilities is the 
‘dynamic capabilities’ view of firm (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Dynamic capabilities can 
be defined as the firm’s processes that integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources to 
adapt to and even create market change (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Thus, by systematically 
coordinating and directing particular resources through firm-specific routines, ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ enable creation of new products and processes by responding to changing market 
circumstances. The changes can range from incremental changes in products and processes to 
more radical transformation of competences and knowledge.  
Innovation process involves a search for new information outside the existing knowledge base, 
and is a crucial dynamic capability, especially within high-technology firms. A common 
feature across successful Innovation processes is explicit linkage between the focal firm and 
knowledge sources outside the firm, including with researchers at universities, government 
laboratories and other research oriented firms. Therefore an organisational capabilities view of 
a firm considered in isolation from the institutional environment, particularly the nature of the 
public-science system and engagement of firms with them, cannot fully explain how firms 
organise new resources and develop their innovation capabilities (particularly technological).  
Uncertainties and costs of conducting research could be minimized if institutions facilitate 
firms to access radical technologies and skills in the public-science system. By systematically 
coordinating and directing specific inputs for radical innovation, such as human, technology 
and materials through firm-specific rules and procedures, firms in ETC’s may then develop 
distinctive capabilities for low-cost innovation that provide unique competitive advantages.  
Summing up, though research on low-cost innovation has thus far been enriched by several 
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empirical case studies, and although some studies have attempted to integrate institutional 
theory to explain low-cost innovation, I believe that none explain how firms come to develop 
such ‘capabilities’ and  what role radical innovation plays. Previous research has elaborated on 
the ‘market based’ view of low-cost innovations captured under various terminologies such as 
‘Frugal’, ‘Good-enough’, ‘Resource-constrained’ etc. This study however argues that low-cost 
innovation capabilities are profoundly influenced by the structuring of institutions.  
Methodology 
Case Study Method and Case selection 
This research uses a case study approach (Yin, 2013), and qualitative evidence is not used to 
build a generalised theory but rather to provide examples and opinions that reflect various 
features and characteristics of institutions and markets. Because the study offers a prognosis of 
low-cost and radical innovation capabilities in ETC’s, exploratory case studies are useful. The 
study looks at innovations within two technological domains: Rechargeable Batteries and 
Point-of-use (PoU) water purification. The study draws on two successful low-cost innovations 
launched in an ETC context – BYD’s low-cost manufacturing of rechargeable LIBs that started 
in China in 1995 and Tata’s ‘Swach’ low-cost water purifier launched in India in 2009, both 
often described in the literature as examples of low-cost Innovation.  
The two domains were chosen because it allowed placing the two innovations in the context of 
new and potentially radical technology developments in respective countries, supporting 
analysis of the impact of institutional dynamics on the nature of innovation capabilities. In the 
case of China, for e.g. I touch on China’s Collaborative Innovation Centre in Chemical Science 
and Engineering (CICCSE) based at Tianjin and Nankai Universities (McGilvray, 2016) who 
have developed a potentially radical low-cost battery technology - Sodium-Carbon dioxide 
batteries (Kramer, 2016). I particularly touch on this invention at CICCSE because the current 
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challenge in a new battery technology is not just the speed of charging, but more importantly 
charge density. The Sodium-Carbon dioxide batteries can store much higher charge (currently 
five times) compared to LIBs. In the case of India, I touch on advanced nano-materials for 
water purification developed at Indian Institute of Technology Madras (IITM) (Gravotta, 
2013). I have particularly picked this technology because the challenge in developing a low-
cost purifier is not just about being ‘good-enough’ in killing the bacteria and removing 
turbidity, but meeting more complex water purification challenges at low-cost.  The IITM 
technology can remove Arsenic and other toxic metals. 
Data Sources and Analysis 
The research is based on (a.) sizeable secondary archival data from mass media and academic 
case studies, (b.) detailed analysis of patents and (c.) additional primary data (see table 1). 
Interviews in mass media are accepted as credible as it is presumed that they cannot be released 
without the consent of interviewees (Lim, Han, & Ito, 2013). Further, technical information in 
mass media sources were also cross checked for accuracy by comparing with peer reviewed 
scientific publications. In the case of India, I was also able to gain expert insights through 
primary interviews with academics active in low cost water innovation – Prof. Murali Shastri 
who was previously Chief Scientific Officer at Tata and Prof. T Pradeep, principal investigator 
of the IITM Nanotechnology Innovation.   
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Table 1: Key Sources of Data 
Subject Data type and description Sources Period 
Rechargeable 
Battery 
Innovation in 
China 
Secondary data on Battery 
Innovation and Vertical 
diversification at BYD. 
Three mass media sources 
and five case studies.  
Mass Media: Dongmei, 
Binbin, Yanyan, and Duan 
(2010); Gunther (2009); 
IHS Markit (2010) 
Case studies: Huckman 
and MacCormack (2006); 
Quan, Loon, and 
Sanderson (2018); Wan, 
Donsheng and 
Chatopadhyay (2013); 
Wang and Kimble (2010); 
Wang and Yang (2013) 
2006-
2018 
Patent analysis of BYD’s 
battery innovations  
LENS database 
 
2000 –
May 
2018 
Secondary data on Sodium 
Carbon-dioxide (NaCO2) 
battery. 
Mass media: McGilvray 
(2016); Kramer (2016);  
Scientific Publications: 
2016-
2017 
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Two mass media sources 
and two Scientific 
publications. 
Hu, et al. (2016); Hu, et 
al. (2017) 
Point-of-Use 
Water 
Purification 
Innovation in 
India   
 
Secondary data on Tata 
Swach. 
Seven mass media sources, 
Tata’s Quarterly Magazine 
‘Tata Review’ and a Patent 
application. 
Mass media: AFP (2009); 
Chandra, 2010; Iyer 
(2009); Murray(2011); 
Sharma and Nupur 
(2012); Singh (2011); 
Subbu (2009) 
Tata Review: Rodrigues 
(2010) 
Patent application: Sastry, 
Rautaray, Parida and 
Kandukuri, 2010  
2009-
2012 
Patent Analysis of Tata’s 
Water Purification 
Innovation 
LENS database 2010 – 
May 
2018 
Secondary data on IITM 
Nanomaterials Innovation. 
Seven mass media sources 
and two scientific 
Mass media: Gravotta 
(2013); Janin (2016); 
Jayaraman (2007); Kodati 
(2016); Murali (2007); 
Prasad (2016); Singh 
2007-
2016 
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publications. (2008);  
Scientific Publications: 
Kumar, et al. (2016); 
Pradeep and Anshup 
(2009) 
Primary data: Interview 
with Previous Chief 
Scientific Officer at Tata. 
Prof. Murali Sastry, IITB-
Monash Research 
Academy 
2017 
Primary data: Interview 
with Principal Investigator 
of IITM Nanomaterials 
Innovation. 
Prof. T. Pradeep, IITM 2017 
 
Patent data was analysed using LENS2 database to infer Innovation priorities and strategies of 
firms. I have used the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) which includes the same 
sections as the International Patent Classification (IPC), plus a Y section for tagging emerging 
technologies or technologies spanning several sections of the CPC. Patent data are a relevant 
measure for knowledge development and diffusion, and have been widely used as a measure 
of inventive activity and knowledge flows (Meyer, 2002; Stephan, Schmidt, Bening, & 
Hoffman, 2017). Patent counts can thus provide a proxy for a firm’s innovation capability and 
future technological trajectory. However, for novel technologies that are not yet commercial, 
                                                          
2 http://www.lens.org/ 
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generally little or no data is available, as firms usually seek to keep their research activities 
secret from competitors. Nonetheless, patent data may still help understand and analyse the 
Innovation direction of a firm. 
Water purification related patents can be found under CPC C02F (Treatment of water, waste 
water, sewage and sludge). Battery related technologies can be primarily found under CPC’s 
H01M (Process or means for conversion of chemical to electrical energy), Y02E60/12 (new 
technological developments in battery). Table 2 below shows the exact CPC numbers used 
for searching patents on rechargeable batteries and auxiliary non-active parts and safety 
devices. I also used a keyword search strategy for the auxiliary parts and system design 
search. 
Table 2: Battery related Patent Analysis search strategy 
Description  Search strategy 
LIB technologies CPC: H01M 10/052*, Y02E 60/122, Y02T 10/7011  
Alkaline batteries (not within 
H01M6 i.e. Primary or non-
rechargeable  batteries), Nickel 
Metal Hydride (NiMH), Nickel 
Cadmium (NiCd) 
CPC: H01M 10/28*, 10/24–10/32, 4/24*, 4/24–4/34, 10/345, 
Y02E 60/124  
Regenerative Fuel Cells (these 
can be classed as Secondary or 
rechargeable Batteries)  
CPC: H01M 8/188, Y02E 60/528  
Auxiliary parts or system 
assembly 
Strategy 1 – CPC search for Patents related to non-active 
parts and safety devices under H01M but excluding primary 
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and fuel cells: H01M2/*, H01M2200* NOT (H01M6* OR 
H01M8* OR H01M16* OR H01M2250*)  
Strategy 2 -  Keyword search e.g. heating circuit, end cover, 
supply system, power system, control system, cooling plate, 
battery separator, electric connector etc.  
 
Findings and Discussions 
Rechargeable Battery Innovation in China 
Early Diffusion-Oriented Industrial Policy and Cost-Innovation 
BYD Co. of China has emerged as one of the major rechargeable battery manufacturers today. 
It was founded in 1995 by Wang Chuanfu, a chemist and government scientist to manufacture 
rechargeable batteries, when the battery market in China was huge, but dominated by Japanese 
imports at very high prices. By 2009, the company occupied 10% of global market share for 
LIBs and was the second largest LIB supplier for mobile phones in the world (Shirouzu, 2009). 
Today it occupies 25% of the market share (Lux Research, 2017) 
BYD’s entry and gaining a share from Japanese rivals in a high growth market for LIBs is 
attributed to developing new low-cost ‘process’ innovation capabilities as a result of replacing 
expensive machinery with a semi-automated line (Quan & Sanderson, 2013). Moreover, BYD 
also reduced processing cost by using materials in products that were less sensitive to humidity 
and required less dry room space (Huckman & MacCormack, 2006). Zeschky et al. (2014) 
categorise BYD’s battery innovation as cost innovation which is low in technical novelty and 
market novelty, because it offers same functionality as other LIBs, but at a lower cost.  
However Rao (2013) suggests that BYD is a low-cost product made using sophisticated 
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technology. Rao does not suggest in what way BYD’s technology is sophisticated, however 
arguably, using alternative materials in their products that were less sensitive to humidity and 
avoided larger expensive dry rooms for processing demonstrates technological sophistication. 
Quan et al. (2018) argue that BYD’s low-cost innovation is in response to price-sensitive 
customers. In 1998, BYD could sell a mobile phone battery for $3 compared to $8 for Japanese 
batteries, whilst still maintaining a profit margin of 60%.  
Nevertheless, presumably such low-cost capabilities were made possible due to the 
composition of China’s labour institutions, i.e. availability of a huge pool of low-cost yet high-
quality labour for R&D in addition to low-cost unskilled labour for manufacturing operations. 
Further, BYD efficiently manages and retains its highly skilled human resources by recruiting 
graduates from the best Chinese universities and offering them plenty of career progression 
opportunities and incentives (Gunther, 2009; Quan, et al., 2018). It was especially easy to find 
good talent in the early days because of the lack of job opportunities for graduates.  
Thus it appears that BYD’s innovation capabilities emerge from a strategic approach to 
managing and training its human capital. In the early 1980’s, China was introducing major 
institutional and policy changes affecting its technological learning system. During this time it 
was heavily dependent on foreign education and technology transfer (Xie & White, 2006). 
Chinese universities focused on producing engineers and scientists than on training them to do 
advanced research, hence the government had to sponsor Chinese students to pursue higher 
education abroad, especially USA. The 1990s saw major policies in advanced manufacturing 
and quality systems, however Chinese firms relied on Multi-National Corporations (MNC’s) 
for technological know-how. Therefore China’s ‘diffusion’ oriented policies in the 1980s and 
1990s did not encourage close long-term links between domestic firms and local university 
researchers and the engagement was usually limited to solving short-term problems.  
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However the weak science-industry link was balanced by a large pool of highly skilled 
graduates (strong labour institutions) in enhancing firms capabilities, especially in particular 
sectors such as in Electronics. Further, BYD worked closely with customers, rather than the 
public-science system, to develop innovation competencies in low-cost-high-quality batteries. 
For example during BYD’s early years, Motorola sent its engineers to work on-site and closely 
with BYD engineers to improve the quality of its batteries. Six months later, BYD earned the 
six-sigma certification, an international badge of quality Motorola itself invented (Fishman, 
2005, p. 215).  By relying on existing technological knowledge around LIBs, and collaborating 
with customers in building firm specific know-how in low-cost process innovation and in 
developing new organisational routines in quality, BYD was able to outdo its Japanese rivals. 
Thus it can be argued that the local labour composition and weak university-industry 
interaction encouraged the integration of existing know-how with support from key customers, 
leading to re-engineering the production process from a largely automated to a semi-automated 
method.  
Firms Innovation Dilemma – why focus on existing technology? 
BYD developed its own internal R&D and manufacturing capabilities with little links into the 
public-science system through the formation of a Central Research Department in 1997, 
renamed as the Central Research Institute (CRI) in 2005. In general, the cooperation between 
universities and enterprises remains weak in China and firms do not have mechanisms to 
effectively absorb universities’ research output (Boeing, Mueller, & Sandner, 2016). Zheng 
(2014) argues that the key factors for Chinese firms to be technologically innovative are more 
internally driven, in alignment with the resource-based and competency-based strategic 
perspective. High-technology Chinese firms focus heavily on developing internal assets such 
as technology champions, entrepreneurship, organisational structural reform, learning and 
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knowledge creation, as well as building a strong financial base (i.e., utilising stock market 
listings to generate capital for growth and expansion). The CRI at BYD employs more than 
300 researchers involved in cross-cutting R&D in areas such as energy storage, automobiles 
and IT. A statement on the website about CRI reads:  
“It not only commits to a variety of new materials research and development, 
but also reserves the high-level compound talents and provides continuously 
strong power to the development of BYD.”  
Moreover, the vision statement reads:  
“By 2015, to own several core technologies in acoustics, photonics, electronics, 
calorifics and magnetics areas; to be capable of developing novel products 
based on metals, ceramics, polymers and their complex. By 2020, to be one of 
the top R&D centers nationwide. By 2030, to be one of the top R&D centers 
worldwide.” 
Interestingly, though BYD has vertically diversified its manufacturing beyond batteries into 
other industry sectors such as transport and solar, however its growth in these sectors is still a 
result of its innovation and production capabilities around its core technological knowledge in 
LIBs (Wang & Yang, 2013). For. Example, the DENZA electric car manufactured by a 50:50 
joint venture between BYD and Daimler Mercedes (BYD Daimler New Technology Co., Ltd. 
or BDNT in short), combines Daimler’s engineering expertise as a worldwide leader in safety 
technology and quality excellence with BYD’s low-cost LIB technology (IHS Markit, 2010).  
Thus from venturing into new end application sectors such as automobiles and externally 
sourcing technological knowledge in these sectors, BYD’s strategy appears to be to reinforce 
and augment its distinctive capabilities in low-cost innovation  around its original core 
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technological domain i.e. LIBs. Such a diversification strategy may not however help build-up 
capability for ‘radical’ innovation in new Battery materials.   I also analysed BYD’s battery 
storage related patents over the last 2 decades between the year 2000 and May 2018.  From 
granted Patent data (families), I found  LIB technology to be 43.8% (71 families) of all  
rechargeable secondary battery and regenerative fuel cell related patent families (162) (see 
figure 1a). Further 42.6% (69 families) for secondary batteries relate to non-active parts 
(H01M2) and safety devices (H01M2200). A keyword search for the most common auxiliary 
parts or system assembly details in the title revealed 61 families for secondary cells (figure 1 
b) which is close to the CPC search for non-active parts and safety devices. I also noted that 
under Y02E60/12 (22 families), LIB patents are 59 % (13), NiCd and NiMH are 22.7% (5) and 
auxiliary parts or assembly details are 18.2% (4) (see figure 1c).  As regards application of 
battery technology, 12.8% (23) of all families under H01M and Y02E60, are also tagged under 
Y02T which relate to new technological developments in green transportation (see figure 1d).  
Patent data therefore suggests that most focus is clearly on existing LIB technology, auxiliary 
parts, assembly details and application to transport. This may also indicate that BYD’s 
approach is largely generalist, emphasizing the use of LIB technology into useful products and 
applications, by integrating multiple auxiliary technologies into a product. Newer influential 
inventions in secondary battery technologies will require researchers with greater depth of 
expertise in materials other than LIB technology.  In short, I see BYD making an effective 
effort to fill gaps in its innovation capacity through focusing on applications and vertical 
diversification.  
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b. Auxiliary parts or system assembly search 
under secondary cells using keyword search 
(excluding regenerative)  
 
c. Composition of Patents under Y02E60/12 
(new battery technology) 
  
Figure 1: Analysis of BYD’s patents between year 2000 and May 2018. 
d. Overlap between battery 
technologies and green 
transportation 
a. Composition of 
Patents related to 
secondary and 
regenerative fuel 
cells 
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Zhou and Wu (2010) argue that a firm with a broad knowledge base is more capable of 
developing radical innovations through internal knowledge sharing rather than acquiring 
external market knowledge acquisition, whereas a firm with a deep knowledge base is more 
capable of achieving radical innovation through enhanced market knowledge acquisition rather 
than internal knowledge sharing. BYD falls in the later with deep knowledge in LIB 
technology, and it can be argued that its vertical diversification is a result of aligning external 
market knowledge with internal knowledge. Though vertical diversification may have a strong 
impact on innovation, because it fuels cross-fertilization between different technology fields, 
BYD’s strategy in applications such as Automotive appears to be ‘creative imitation’ through 
‘reverse engineering’ external Innovations, primarily by using publicly available non-patented 
literature (Dongmei, Binbin, Yanyan, & Duan, 2010; Wan, Dongsheng, & Chattopadhyay, 
2013; Wang & Kimble, 2010) .   Bao, et al. (2012) suggest that external knowledge generated 
by other organisations is a viable strategy that firms can leverage to build radical innovation, 
however this is conditional on learning achieved by committing to strategic alliances and 
embedding in external networks.  The public-science system is an important source of radical 
innovations, however firms wishing to access them have to make considerable investments to 
enhance their ‘absorptive capacity’, by hiring experienced researchers to conduct more generic 
research (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) .  
Public Science policy, priority Economic sectors and Firms Innovation Capabilities 
Because of the weakening of incremental innovation strategy followed by many Chinese firms 
aimed at reducing costs, primarily due to competition from countries in ASEAN3, the Chinese 
government has focussed on endogenous innovation in the last 10 years (Gu, Serger, & 
Lundvall, 2016) including the establishment of collaborative innovation centres (CICs) to 
                                                          
3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
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improve Collaboration between Universities, Industry and government. There have been about 
38 CICs across the country since 2012 (McGilvray, 2016), categorised into four types: 
scientific frontier-oriented, industry-oriented, regional development-oriented and cultural 
heritage innovation-oriented (Fan, Zou, & Lv, 2013). Scientific frontier-oriented CICs cultivate 
world-class scientific research and talent in the natural sciences whereas the Industry-oriented 
CICs focus on fostering emerging strategic industries through advancements in engineering 
and manufacturing. The regional development oriented are funded by local governments and 
may be science or engineering related, however the focus is local needs rather than ‘generic’ 
technologies.  CICSSE is a scientific frontier-oriented centre which receives around $7.5 
million a year in research funding and flexibility to choose its research direction.   
An important potentially radical nanotechnology innovation at CICSSE is the Sodium–Carbon 
dioxide battery (McGilvray, 2016). In principle, these batteries are more energy efficient than 
LIBs (Hu, et al., 2016; Hu, et al., 2017), as well as ‘cheaper’ because of the abundance of 
Sodium and Carbon dioxide (Kramer, 2016).  Because ‘diffusion oriented’ Science policy that 
is closely linked to current problems is unlikely to encourage strong connections between 
industry and researchers in public-science institutions around ‘pre-competitive’ fundamental 
research on remote topics that seeks to explain general phenomena, one would hope that high-
technology research centres like CICCSE would enhance the National capacity for more radical 
innovation.  
However industrial interaction between CICCSE and industry (LIB developer Tianjin Lishen 
and electronics manufacturer Samsung) has focused on improving current technology around 
LIBs (McGilvray, 2016), presumably because the new Sodium-Carbon dioxide technology is 
not yet commercial, and translating it into practical benefit is not trivial. It can initially cost 
circa $500 million to set up a small manufacturing line and conduct further research to make a 
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new battery product (Martin, 2016).  Moreover, in contest with the Chinese government’s own 
focus on endogenous innovation, the government also sees LIBs as a hugely significant 
industry in the 2020s and beyond (Ryan, 2017).  
By 2020, the Chinese government wants to double production of electric cars with LIB 
technology, and has heavily subsidized the electric car industry, turning BYD into the largest 
producer of low-cost electric vehicles globally. However given the uncertainties in the electric 
car market and government subsidies, BYD further diversified into monorail mass transit and 
spent nearly $725 million researching and building a prototype system that involved its 
batteries (Burkitt, 2017).  In Sep 2017, BYD installed its first commercial system (Clover, 
2017), purportedly at one fifth the cost of comparable systems, and BYD hopes to bag contracts 
from many cities across the world. Given that the Chinese government has supported the 
creation of a ‘too big to fail’ LIB industry, diversification though expensive initially, is a 
strategic option for BYD against market uncertainties.      
‘Pre-competitive’ research can result in radical technologies, however when research in 
universities and other public research organisations is facilitated and coordinated by 
government around its public objectives and mission, and not a consequence of strategic R&D 
investments by autonomous firms, technology development will tend to be restricted to a few 
priority areas of economic interest for the government rather than being ‘generic’ (Whitley, 
2007, p. 70). Therefore though China’s high-tech research, whose costs are primarily borne by 
the government as in the case of CIC’s, may lead to newer technologies, however when 
government policy is focused on current priority economic sectors (Liu, Schwaag Serger, 
Tagscherer, & Chang, 2017) and industrial engagement is largely around solving current 
problems within those sectors, the primary emphasis in Chinese firms Innovation strategy will 
be tweaking existing technologies or diversifying into sectors that blends their core capabilities 
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with other current external technologies, and not much  research effort around developing “new 
to the world” scientific ideas and technologies (Gupta & Wang, 2016; Williamson & Yin, 
2014).  
The Sodium-Carbon dioxide batteries can currently store five times more charge and 
theoretically achieve ten times for the same weight as LIB, and use cheaper and more abundant 
materials, i.e. Sodium and the freely available Carbon dioxide in the air. However, 
commercialisation may be challenging because it will be difficult for firms to acquire radically 
new skills to scale such technologies and help realize low production costs in addition to low 
materials costs, if they follow a rather passive approach to working with public-science 
institutes or restrict to incremental improvements to current technologies, and do not actively 
pursue new technological developments through strategic investments.  
Further, in addition to recruiting recent graduates such as seen in the case of BYD, firms may 
have to focus on recruiting leading scientists and highly experienced researchers who have 
spent significant time in public-science institutions even after their PhDs in order to 
commercialise radical technologies that carry a significant level of technical and economic 
uncertainty, especially in the early stages. Therefore the government’s inputs into supporting 
breakthrough research at its elite research institutions will not automatically lead to the creation 
of new products and a financial value for both firms and governments. Chen, Vanhaverbeke, 
and Du (2016) also note that when market information dictates new business opportunities, 
Innovative Chinese firms contract and outsource technological problems that are not 
‘translational’ to universities. Overall, given the economic priorities of the government and the 
passive engagement with universities around current problems, it can be concluded that 
Innovative Chinese firms such as BYD may see no need to develop or internalize high levels 
of technological competencies. Such strategies will therefore limit Chinese firms from 
28 
 
acquiring skills for radical technology development.   
Point-of-use (PoU) Water Purifier Innovation in India 
Unserved market and Frugal Innovation 
In India, access to improved water supply and sanitation remains insufficient. Poor quality of 
drinking water leads to various diseases and high death rate. The ‘Point-of-use’ Water purifier 
market in India was dominated for a long time until late 2000 by Aquaguard from Eureka 
Forbes with a price between Rs 5,000 (~ US $754) and Rs 10,000 (~ US $150), which was not 
affordable to most Indian families. Efforts were made by various companies to build affordable 
water purifiers, e.g. Hindustan Unilever’s PureIt water purifier. But PureIt ran on battery 
(electricity) and it cost around Rs 1,800 (~ US $ 27, battery included) (Ruan & Hang, 2013). 
In response to the affordability constraints of low-income consumers, in Dec 2009 Tata 
launched the “Swach” filter system that uses silver nano-particles infused in rice husk ash 
(RHA), runs on zero electricity (Rodrigues, 2010), and was reportedly claimed as the world’s 
cheapest household water purification system (Rediff Business, 2009). RHA reduces the 
turbidity or cloudiness of the water entering the filter and removes most of the toxic organic 
impurities, and moreover according to Prof. Murali Sastry, the silver nanoparticles kill 99% of 
disease causing bacteria. Developed primarily by Tata groups Tata Chemicals with help from 
other Tata entities, namely Tata Research, Design and Development Centre (TRDDC) and 
Titan Industries, Tata Swach came in two variants, priced at Rs 749 (~ US $11) and Rs 999 (~ 
US $15), at a time when most other purifiers cost more than Rs 2,000 (Rediff Business, 2009). 
Despite the existence of a favourable market and supporting factors such as strong country 
specificity of distribution networks, technologies such as Swach, although effective and 
                                                          
4 1 US $  ~ 67 Indian Rupees (Rs) 
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relatively easy to use, had its own adoption challenges. For instance, though the filters can be 
bought from grocery stores, purify 3,000 litres and last six months for a family of five, and cost 
less than a rupee (1.5 cents) per day per family (Rodrigues, 2010), timely accessibility of filters 
is a key determinant of success in rural India with poor transport and retail infrastructure.  
However, a key innovation, the Tata Swach ‘Fuse’, indicates the capacity remaining in the 
filter, giving householders time to buy a replacement, and automatically shuts it off once the 
purifying admixture is exhausted (Rodrigues, 2010). The fuse is thus an important factor in 
timely product accessibility.  
Firms Innovation dilemma – why focus on basic low-risk technology? 
Though better technology, and timely accessibility of accessories such as filters, are likely to 
be important determinants of PoU water treatment product adoption (Null et al., 2012), most 
evidence  suggests that price considerations dominate the other elements (Ashraf, Berry, & 
Shapro, 2010; Kremer, Miguel, Mullainathan, Null, & Zwane, 2009). Therefore Tata Swach’s 
success is mostly due to trade-offs between product design attributes and price acceptable for 
a potentially large lead-market (Murray, 2011). Though the basic product removed 99% 
bacteria and many organic impurities, it is unable to remove inorganic impurities, particularly 
Fluoride and metal ions such as Arsenic. No ‘simple’ conventional technology exists that 
addresses multiple water quality problems such as bacterial and heavy metal contamination 
together or Heavy metals, turbidity, pesticides and salinity together (Vijay Lakshmi, Nagrath, 
& Jha, 2011).  However, Swach still allowed significant gains to consumer within their 
affordability limits compared to previous consumption of unfiltered water.  
India has built a robust innovation climate around innovations that deliver high value at low 
costs for resource-constrained consumers at the bottom-of-pyramid (BoP), particularly in 
addressing pressing global problems in clean water, healthcare and energy  (Bhati, 2013; 
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Bhattacharya, Shilpa, & Bhati, 2012). Consumers at the BoP not only look for affordable 
products, but also products that entail simplicity and do not comprise non-value adding 
unnecessary features, user-friendly in both composition and function, and products that are 
durable (Taube, 2018). Such scarcity induced innovations that are affordable yet disrupt a 
market and serve a significant volume of customers have also been called frugal innovations 
(Radjou, et al., 2012).  
An important premise of frugality is that low cost does not mean low- tech (Bound & Thornton, 
2012). ‘Frugal innovation’ is not just low-tech or cheaper versions of existing technologies, 
and can combine low and high technology, for e.g. in the case of Tata Swach, combining RHA 
(low-tech) with silver nanotechnology that is considered high-tech (Wooldridge, 2012). It 
appears that this is based on the assumption that nano-silver is something new given the 
increase in number of consumer applications since early 2000’s. However, nano-silver has been 
used for nearly a century and was registered as a biocidal material in the United States in 1954 
(Nowack, Krug, & Height, 2011). Tata Chemicals innovation was in finding the right chemistry 
to bind silver nanoparticles to RHA (Chandra, 2010), and it is arguable whether this is advanced 
cutting-edge technology. Whilst the design of the system may be considered novel, silver 
nanotechnology is in itself not new and neither does Tata Chemicals claim the ‘right’ chemistry 
to bind silver to RHA as unfamiliar. Tata Chemicals claims are in fact about the antimicrobial 
effectiveness of a specific composition of RHA and nano-silver (see Sastry, Rautaray, Parida, 
& Kandukuri, 2010), which I therefore argue is incremental innovation.  
India’s present status of Nanotechnology R&D is still not comparable to developed countries 
such as US, Japan and Germany, or even China’s (Dong, et al., 2016; Ghosh & Krishnan, 
2014). Though India has strengthened the supply side of the innovation in the public-science 
system, however there is less clarity in terms of priority areas unlike China which has clear 
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strategies and priority applications (Anand & Sarma, 2013). Further, India’s policies are still 
weak in supporting scalability of R&D, including a lack of Venture Capital funding particularly 
for Physical sciences based start-ups (Kodati, 2016). Advanced and more radical 
nanotechnology innovation requires institutional complementarities between a strong ‘mission’ 
oriented public-science system and the existence of a strong venture finance system to 
commercialise high risk nanotechnologies with a long gestation period.  It appears that a weak 
interaction between public-science institutions and firms in India, compounded by the lack of 
skills to commercialise scientific output may have led to a focus on low-cost, low-risk 
incremental technologies in both public-science institutions and firms (Ali & Sinha, 2014). 
These factors may also be responsible for a lack of industry participation and VC confidence 
in more advanced high-risk nanotechnology R&D.  
The initial ideas that led to the development of Swach were in fact initiated by Prof. PC Kapoor 
at a public-science institution, ‘Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur (IITK)’ in the 1980s. 
After his retirement he continued his work at Tata’s research arm ‘TRDDC’ where a 
rudimentary device ‘Sujal’ was developed in late 1990s using RHA and pebbles.  However, 
Sujal wasn’t commercially successful because of its inability to remove many bacteria 
(Rodrigues, 2010). The project was revived in 2006, and it took two years for the development 
of Swach when Tata Chemicals at their Innovation centre found the right chemistry to bind 
silver nano-particles that has significant antibacterial properties to RHA. Interestingly the Chief 
Scientific Officer of Tata Chemicals Prof. Murali Sastry had also moved in from a public-
science institution, the ‘National Chemical Laboratory’. Overall the development journey of 
even a low-cost water purification device points to a weak commercialisation mechanism of 
public-science during the period. The initial science that had emerged from a public-science 
institution was not commercialised by it. Tata independently developed the ‘Swach’ purifier 
by developing organisational routines for embedding tacit knowledge brought in by researchers 
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who previously worked at public-science institutions.    
Therefore it is likely that weak university-industry links, a weak VC financing system, and a 
pressing need to meet basic needs of people led to a focus on a simpler low-risk silver 
nanotechnology based solution in the design of Tata Swach. It is also expedient for firms to 
ensure that low-risk technology research is exploited, because commercial successes of low-
cost solutions could help catalyse innovation around more advanced technologies (Singh, 
2011)  
Moreover, when Swach was launched, Tata Chemicals focus also appears to be to provide 
consumers their right to clean water given failures in public policy (Iyer, 2009; Sharma & 
Nupur, 2012), and set aside commercial returns for longer term (AFP, 2009). This may suggest 
that firms such as Tata who have the resources and reputational advantage can increase their 
strategic commitments in shaping their institutional environment (Cheng, Zuzul, Jones, & 
Khanna, 2017). Companies and institutions may not always be mutually exclusive and 
elements of the state and the private sector can morph into each other (Dieleman & Sachs, 
2008). It can therefore be argued that firms such as Tata who wield enormous local influence 
can be regarded as a national institution. While resources and reputational advantage can help 
firms in overcoming institutional voids, filling an institutional void can enhance reputational 
advantage.  
Besides, a firm that fills a void will not only gain consumers attention, but also democratise 
innovation by encouraging other firms to find better solutions and play a more active role in 
generating and diffusing innovation (Iyer, 2009; Murray, 2011; PTI, 2011). It may also promote 
entrepreneurial and commercialisation activities in the public-science system, ultimately 
strengthening institutions by increasing firms access to external scientific and technological 
input and appropriating value from them into innovative output.  
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Public Science Policy, R&D and Venture funding, and Firms Innovation Capabilities 
Tata’s competitor, Eureka Forbes however licensed a nanotechnology intellectual property on 
a new ‘material’ from another public-science institution ‘Indian Institute of Technology 
Madras (IITM)’ in 2004 in order to remove pesticides. Though it had introduced the technology 
in some of its products, and claimed to be the first nanotechnology based water filter (Murali, 
2007), the products were not targeted for base-of-pyramid income groups, because the 
production could not be scaled to bring down the costs (Singh, 2008). Moreover the filter was 
used as a retrofit on its existing products to additionally remove pesticides (Jayaraman, 2007). 
Subsequently IITM created a spin-off business ‘InnoNano Research’ (INR) in 2008 to produce 
a non-electric water-purifier based on new nano-materials it had been developing to capture 
ions like arsenic, iron and fluorides, and effectively kill microorganisms, and also make 
affordable water filters for base-of-pyramid that can tackle complex water problems (Gravotta, 
2013; Kumar, et al., 2016; Pradeep & Anshup, 2009).  
The main investigator at IITM, Prof. Pradeep, has received research support from the 
governments Department of Science and Technology (DST) which also supported a ‘Thematic 
unit of excellence in Water purification’. After many pilot studies, it was only in 2016 that a 
US based VC firm Nanoholdings plc acquired InnoNano for $18 million (Rs 1.2 billion) 
(Prasad, 2016) and formed a separate company headquartered in Singapore, ‘Safewater Nano 
pte’, to globally commercialise its water purifier that can effectively tackle complex water 
problems and remove metal ions, fluorides and bacteria without requiring any electricity. 
Nanoholdings plc had also previously for four years supported InnoNano’s global patenting 
activity before the acquisition. InnoNano’s water filter is called AMRIT, which literally means 
nectar in Hindi language, is also an abbreviation for Arsenic and Metal ion Removal using 
Indian Technology. The unit costs $16 and can provide clean water for an impoverished family 
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for an entire year (Gravotta, 2013; Janin, 2016). 
It appears that IITM was able to lead ‘new materials’ research for water purification, because 
state funded research in India, especially in ‘basic R&D’, is mostly allocated to a handful of 
elite research universities and institutes (Varma, 2014).  In the best public-science institutions 
such as the various IIT’s in India, they not only recruit the best academic staff and students, 
but the academic staff are likely to remain in them for most of their scientific careers because 
of their ability to attract resources and funding for research due to the elite status of their 
institutions. Interestingly, elite research institutions such as the IIT’s were created with on-
campus housing to support research staff careers.  
Further, a recently announced Prime Minsters Research Fellowship (PMRF) (Sanghi, 2018), 
which adds a significant increase to research funding in India, confirms this disparity.  PMRF 
is targeted at attracting the best students from a small select group of about 60 higher education 
institutions to a handful of 17 elite research institutions. I argue that, when public-science and 
industry links are weak and local venture finance mechanisms are also weak, policies that are 
not highly competitive in distributing public funds to researchers in public-science 
organisations and mostly handed to elite institutions, may not encourage research efficiency in 
finding novel yet lowest-cost technological solutions in the shorter term for pressing issues 
such as access to clean water. Additionally, according to Prof. Murali Sastry, “issues around 
accessibility and distribution of funding not only exists for lab research, but also in the 
government’s various recent venture funding mechanisms (including soft-loans) for scaling-up 
scientific output. This ecosystem is evolving with the emergence of VC and Angel Investor 
firms.”      
Notably, though the team at IITM initially received funding for pilot studies to test the product, 
however lack of necessary venture finance during seed stages of commercialisation and 
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industry support for scale-up hindered the speed of commercialisation. This is also presumably 
because the commercial prospects of inventing completely ‘New’ materials are uncertain and 
take longer time, unlike Tata’s effort to find the right chemistry to bind nano-Silver to RHA in 
an existing rudimentary device. InnoNano was created five years after the research efforts 
started in 2003, however it took another eight years since InnoNano before it received any 
significant venture backing, that too from a non-local VC firm.  
Further, the PoU water purification market is very competitive in India, and the lack of uptake 
by the incumbent players may be due to both the technical and market uncertainty of ‘new 
materials’. Even for incumbent firms such as Tata and Eureka Forbes, resolving technological 
uncertainty requires a high level of investment over a long period of time because of pilot plants 
and process innovation required to meet economies of scale. Moreover in a highly competitive 
PoU water market, trialability will require a full working system and even then consumers may 
not be able to easily observe the new technology as regards its universal attributes to remove 
metal ions, fluorides and microorganisms. In addition, despite its universal attributes, targeting 
many different developing country markets may require different designs because of different 
consumer attitudes and design familiarity.  
Thus given the long gestation period of advanced nano-materials R&D, it may be challenging 
to deliver the water purification system at low-cost for consumers without significant initial 
investment and being patient about a long period for return on investment. In addition, unlike 
the case of the rudimentary Sujal device that needed an incremental nanotechnology solution 
and for which Tata Chemicals recruited experienced academic researchers, firms rarely have 
an interest in actively engaging with academic researchers conducting generic research with 
potentially radical outcomes given the risks involved. Though  Prof. Pradeep says that “ firms 
who earlier came to me for a short three month problem solving project are willing to commit 
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now for five years and also fund 20-30% of equipment costs”, however he also admits that “ 
this is not true across the system and limited to very few academics”. If firms engage with 
public-science institutions on a larger scale, it can reduce costs of undertaking research and 
encourage integration of new transformational knowledge into firm’s capabilities, thus leading 
to faster diffusion of radical low-cost solutions.  
Both our interviewees also admit that in general, the appetite of firms to recruit senior 
researchers from academic institutions is weak in materials science based industry. Moreover, 
if they have to recruit them even for incremental solutions such as in the case of Tata 
Chemicals, it indicates a weak absorptive capacity of firms and this could also explain the lack 
of active engagement with academic researchers working in more remote areas.  
Tata Chemicals now not only sells a few variants of the original non-electric Swach purifier, 
but it also produces an electric variant that is not targeted at the low income consumer. 
Moreover the electric variant combines other existing technologies with its own silver 
impregnation technology. Though Tata’s strategic choice to start with an offer to the low 
income consumers may have made it appear more innovative, and sometimes the original 
Swach has been referred to as market disruptive, it appears that it hasn’t engaged in more 
advanced materials development that can solve multiple water quality problems at low cost, 
and it has rather diversified into offering a higher priced product not targeted for the low income 
groups.  
An analysis of Tata’s water purification patents since early publications in 2010 until May 2018 
reveals 27 patent families, however the number of granted patent families is only 2 till date 
(one each in year 2014 and 2015). Further looking at patenting activity (families) by priority 
or grant year in figure 2, most patenting activity was in the three years between 2010 and 2012 
(16 families) just after the release of Tata Swach in Dec 2009, and there have only been 11 
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patents in the five years since 2012. Further, since 2012, the patenting activity has shown a 
downward trend. Moreover, there has only been one Patent family on heavy metal (Arsenic) 
removal in 2012, which has still not been granted.   
 
Figure 2: Analysis of Tata’s Patents related to Point of Use Water Purification 
The above patenting trend may possibly be a result of weak innovation capability of firms due 
to lack of engagement with academics working in more remote areas, taking into observation 
the fact that Prof. Murali Sastry had also left Tata Chemicals around 2011. In the article by 
Singh (2011), Sastry alludes that there is considerable scope for new materials given the 
success of Swach. Further, Singh (2011) and Subbu (2009) affirm that Tata chemicals was 
testing attachments that can remove arsenic and fluoride, and a version of Swach would soon 
carry such attachments. However, patenting activity and Tata’s current product offerings do 
not confirm commercialisation of these efforts.  
Tellis, et al. (2009) who surveyed firms in 17 emerging countries including India, argue that 
national drivers are unlikely to be major discriminators of a firm’s performance and corporate 
culture is important for radical innovation. I agree that ‘Corporate culture’ is significant, which 
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in the current context entails engaging leading academic researchers in ‘New’ materials 
innovation in order to cannibalize legacy products and demonstrate future market orientation.  
However, I also argue that when public funding mechanisms in fundamental R&D favours a 
handful of elite research institutions, firms have limited opportunity for engagement.  
Though in 2007, Tata setup the “Tata Group Innovation Forum” (TGIF) to leverage internal 
resources and skills (Bhandari, 2013), and engaged leading academics from elite Business 
schools as consultants and advisors, however recently in 2016 Tata group entered into alliances 
with elite public-science Institutions globally (Mendonca & Sengupta, 2016). It has set aside 
£25m to fund cutting edge research, including in advanced materials, at Harvard and Yale 
Universities in the US, and also send its researchers for training.  In India, Tata steel has 
recently setup the ‘Tata Steel Advanced Materials Research Centre” (TSAMRC) at IITM in 
2017, which will initially be developing new materials for green energy and light-weighting 
applications (The Avenue Mail, 2017). It appears that there is willingness for gaining novel 
research skills in ‘new’ materials from the public-science base and although it is early days, 
yet when engagement is limited in size and scope to a few elite research institutions, firms may 
find it difficult to change their innovative competencies in the short to medium term. 
Nonetheless, the recent efforts by Tata does not disclaim my specific observations around Tata 
Chemicals innovations in PoU water purification during the observed period, nor does it affect 
my general examination of broader institutional features. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
Previous literature has focused on ‘how’ BYD’s success is a result of its capability to 
reengineer a new process for making rechargeable LIBs in response to market needs and size 
(Quan, et al., 2017; Rao, 2013; Williamson, 2010; Zeschky, et al., 2014). Further, previous 
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literature also suggests that the development of distinctive low-cost capabilities at BYD was a 
result of sourcing technological knowledge externally and developing new organisational 
routines and production processes by coordinating with partners (Fishman, 2005, p. 215).   It 
is therefore not hyperbole to infer that previous studies have largely ignored institutional 
drivers. I have argued that such low-cost ‘incremental’ innovation capabilities were primarily 
a result of Chinas earlier diffusion oriented policies for producing scientific and technical 
labour without advanced research skills. Further weak university-industry links meant that 
engagement was normally restricted to solving short-term problems, and Chinese firms had to 
therefore rely on outside MNC’s for developing their distinctive capabilities.   
 
BYD’s current strategy appears to be to reinforce its core low-cost capabilities in LIBs through 
diversifying into applications such as automobiles. This is presumably due to Chinese 
governments focus on supporting scaling-up of existing technologies in priority economic 
sectors which is in contest with its policy on enhancing endogenous innovation capability.  
Moreover, though the stated aims of CRI are to research on ‘new materials’ and become a 
prime R&D centre nationally and globally, I do not find patenting evidence of active strategic 
investments in ‘new battery technology’ in the last two decades, and data suggests that most 
focus has been improvements to existing LIB technologies.  
 
Despite  the creation of innovation centres such as CICCSE to bolster national capability in 
advanced research, industrial engagement appears to be in solving current problems and I did 
not find evidence of active support for commercial development of remote technologies.  Even 
if public-science institutions are engaged with industry, unless firms make strategic R&D 
investments and recruit leading researchers from universities, engagement is likely to be in 
solving current problems within the governments priority sectors, rather than in ‘generic’ and 
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‘pre-competitive’ areas even though they hold potential for newer and higher performance 
technologies at lower cost like Sodium-Carbon dioxide batteries at CICCSE.  I therefore find 
inconsistencies in both current firm level strategy and national policy level that would hinder 
development of radical low-cost innovation in new battery technologies in China.  
In the case of Tata, previous literature suggests that the large consumer demand for a low-cost 
water purification solution for the BoP income group was the primary reason for Tata’s 
response in the form of Swach (Tiwari & Herstatt, 2012). Further, previous literature also 
suggests that frugal innovation does not mean low-tech or cheaper versions of existing 
technologies, and that innovations such as Tata Swach combine low-tech with high-tech 
(Bound & Thornton, 2012; Wooldridge, 2012). I have argued that the technology in Tata Swach 
is not high-tech and that Tata’s focus on simpler low-risk nanotechnology is a result of its weak 
‘absorptive capacity’. Even for an incremental innovation, Tata needed to recruit leading 
scientists from public-science institutions who brought in their tacit knowledge, thus indicating 
a weak ‘absorptive capacity’. Previous literature has therefore largely ignored how institutions, 
particularly public-science system and firms engagement with them frames low-cost 
incremental innovation capabilities.   
Tata’s initial altruistic mission to provide low-cost and affordable clean-water solutions for 
BoP suggests that firms such as Tata who have the resources can increase their strategic 
commitments and come to be regarded as a key institution. However, I find a drift from Tata’s 
original mission, because it also now offers an electric variant targeted at the higher income 
group. This implies weak capability for more radical innovation and a lack of engagement with 
academic researchers working in more remote areas like that at IITM that led to new nano-
materials with potential for a low-cost non-electric purifier.  
One could however also assume that firms in general have limited opportunities for 
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engagement, because only a handful of elite institutions conduct research in remote areas. 
Nevertheless, even Tata’s competitor in PoU water purification, Eureka Forbes, only licensed 
a technology from IITM to retrofit onto its existing product offers not targeted at the BoP.  
IITM had to independently progress a new venture that had a long-gestation before it received 
any support, that too from a non-local VC firm to globally commercialize innovation around 
its new nano-materials. In addition to a weak VC system, this may also imply lack of appetite 
from local firms for highly uncertain research around new materials.  Despite our above 
observation, if one assumes that developmental issues around clean water necessitate shorter 
term solutions, it is questionable whether distribution of public funds in remote areas to a 
handful of elite research institutions like the various IITs, and hence a lack of research 
competition can provide the lowest-cost solutions.   
The current largely market based understanding of ‘low-cost’ innovation does not therefore 
adequately mirror the more complex reality on institutional drivers and changes. Both the cases 
illustrate that diffusion oriented policies and weak university-industry links played a critical 
role in firms low-cost incremental innovations, either by providing technical and scientific 
labour at low cost as in the case of BYD, or by supplying tacit knowledge through leading 
academics as in the case of Tata.  
However as regards remote and ‘pre-competitive’ research conducted by the public-science 
system, with the potential for radical technologies that give better performance at even lower 
costs, the current structure of institutions and firms strategies may not encourage their 
commercial development, especially because of a lack of strategic investment in uncertain 
R&D by incumbent firms. The passive engagement of firms may be due to mission drift caused 
by lack of sufficient opportunities to engage with the public-science system or because of 
government support for priority economic sectors. Arguably, institutional changes are resisted 
more than technological changes (Lastres, 1994), and one would therefore anticipate that the 
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more pervasive and radical are technological changes, the more significant will be changes in 
public-science institutions and engagement with industry, thus readjusting the entire innovation 
system to a new form of developing and diffusing technologies. 
Since only two cases were examined, further empirical research on competencies of both 
domestic and foreign firms in ETC’s is clearly warranted to confirm our conclusions.  The 
conclusions of this study would be useful to both firms and policy makers, in encouraging 
institutions to facilitate firms in developing linkages with the public science system. I hope that 
this study will provide justification for governments in ETC’s to balance growth in priority 
economic sectors with endogenous innovation and in ensuring research efficiency for meeting 
challenges to pressing problems. Further, I hope that this study will support firms in ETC’s to 
comprehend the paramount need to scale radical innovations emerging from the public-science 
system. Given the current shifts in the policy of key emerging countries such as the current 
Indian government’s focus on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) led manufacturing campaign 
‘Make in India’ (Srivastava, 2015), the assumptions and conclusions in this study may be 
replaced. Nevertheless, this study will hopefully encourage both firms and policy makers in 
enhancing the overall innovation system. This would lead to a robust business environment 
that promotes entrepreneurial activities and ultimately increases innovative output at the firm 
level. 
However it should be emphasised that beyond offering directions for practice, the main purpose 
of this study was to highlight a promising direction for future research that focuses on how 
firms in ETC’s develop distinctive capabilities for low-cost innovation and examine the 
implications of external learning for radical low-cost innovation. Current literature is focused 
on demand as a key driver of low-cost Innovation (Herstatt & Tiwari, 2017; Petrick, & 
Juntiwasarakij, 2011; Radjou, et al., 2012) and some attempt to understand how firms 
overcome institutional constraints (Bhatti & Ventresca, 2013; Ernst, et al., 2015).  The 
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literature is weak in offering a prognosis of how institutions facilitate low-cost innovation in 
ETC’s and what mechanisms are needed to augment capabilities of firms, and hence my 
research will greatly add to the growing body of knowledge and debate in the field. Many 
studies in the field are of a conceptual nature attempting to understand the boundaries of various 
terminologies.  This study sheds light on the importance of an underappreciated topic in an 
under-theorised setting. This study provides a more comprehensive and balanced perspective 
of both firm level and institutional context of innovation in ETC’s. Scholars, managers and 
government’s may gain useful lens and insights on innovation capabilities from this study and 
extend them in their pursuit of specific academic, managerial strategy and policy efforts in the 
context of ETC’s. 
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